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DRUG FELONY CAPITAL MURDER IN VIRGINIA
BY: SHARRON LAMOREAUX
In 1990, Virginia amended its capital murder statute, Virginia
Code § 18.2-31, by adding subdivision 9. The amendment provides that
a killing during and for the purpose of furthering a drug transaction
constitutes capital murder, punishable by the death penalty or life
imprisonment. It is important for attorneys defending clients faced with
murder and/or drug charges to be aware of the new provision and of its
meaning. This article explores the structure and scope of § 18.2-31(9)
and compares it to a somewhat similar federal statute.
Statutory Structure
The Virginia drug felony capital murder provision involves three
separate code sections. Virginia Code § 18.2-31(9) establishes that
capital murder includes a"willful, deliberate, and premeditated killing of
any person in the commission of or attempted commission of a violation
of § 18.2-248, involving a Schedule I or II controlled substance, when
such killing is for the purpose of furthering the commission or attempted
commission of such violation." Without § 18.2-31(9), a killing during a
violation of § 18.2-248 could not be classified as capital murder solely
because of that violation.
Section 18.2-248, violation of which is the felony predicate for §
18.2-31(9), addresses the distribution of drugs. Under this section, it is
illegal to "manufacture, sell, give, distribute, or possess with intent to
manufacture, sell, give or distribute a controlled substance or an imita-
tion controlled substance" without authorization. Maximum punish-
ments for violations vary with the nature of the substances involved.
Trafficking in less serious drugs is a misdemeanor, punishable by jail
time of not more than one year and/or a fine of not more than $2,500.1 A
violation of § 18.2-248 involving more serious drugs is punishable by
five to forty years for the first offense and as much as a life sentence for
subsequent convictions.
Controlled substances are classified as to their degree of serious-
ness by five schedules in The Drug Control Act, codified at Virginia
Code § 54.1-3400 et sequitur. Only substances in Schedules I and II are
pertinent to the drug felony murder provision - murders involving
substances from Schedules III, IV, and V are not provided for in § 18.2-
31. Schedules I and II include substances that have a high potential for
abuse, such as heroin, mescaline, methaqualone, morphine, and co-
caine.
2
Statutory Breadth: Picking the Correct Defendant
Determining the scope of § 18.2-31(9) requires examining several
aspects of § 18.2-31(9) itself and of § 18.2-248. The role of The Drug
Control Act in this determination, although important for purposes of
knowing which substances are in Schedules I and II and which are not, is
fairly straightforward and consequently will not be further considered in
this article.
It should first be noted that first degree murder is necessary for §
18.2-31(9) to apply. As with the other subsections of the capital murder
statute, subsection 9 requires a "willful, deliberate, and premeditated"
killing. Although the usual rule that premeditation need not exist for any
specified period of time prior to the killing applies,3 still the intent to kill
must be formed before or at the time of the murder.4 An unintentional or
grossly negligent ormalicious killing that occurs during a drug transaction,
therefore, would not be covered by the statute.
A second factor limiting the scope of the drug felony murder
provision arises from § 18.2-248. Section 18.2-248 is a specific intent law
-itrequires manufacture, distribution, orpossession of drugs or imitation
drugs with intent to manufacture or distribute the same. Committing a
prohibited act without having the prohibited intent is not a violation of this
section and thus not a basis for a capital murder charge. For example,
processing or transferring an illegal substance, thereby committing a
prohibited act, without being aware of its illegality and thus not having the
prohibited intent is not a violation. A murder to facilitate such an act would
therefore not qualify as capital murder.
Furthermore, simple possession of a drug is also not encompassed
by § 18.2-248. 5 Although possession may violate another Virginia law,
6
it is no violation of § 18.2-248 and thus again cannot be a basis fora capital
murder charge. Apparently, then, a killing to further mere possession of
a controlled substance, without intent to subsequently transfer the sub-
stance, is not chargeable as capital murder.
Finally, the last clause of § 18.2-31(9) is significant. The clause
specifies that a murder during the commission or attempted commission
of a § 18.2-248 violation must be "for the purpose of furthering the
commission or attempted commission of such violation." This phrase on
its face seems to narrow the applicability of§ 18.2-31(9) to premeditated
murders committed in the course of an illegal drug transaction expressly
to advance that transaction. Premeditated murders committed during dru,
transactions but not to aid or advance the transactions would appear to be
outside the capital murder provision. Because the requirement is "for the
purpose of furthering," however, murders undertaken to aid the drug
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transaction but which fail in their purpose, either not aiding or actually
hindering the affair, appear to be included.
A Federal Comparison
The Virginia drug felony capital murder provision is somewhat
similar to a recent U.S. statute allowing the imposition of the death penalty
for certain murders that occur, among other situations, in or for drug
transactions. 7 The Virginia provision may have been motivated by the
federal statute, which was passed in 1988. There are a few significant
differences between the two pieces of legislation that are worth exploring
here.
The first difference is that whereas the federal statute is aimed at
participants in criminal organizations and drug traffickers who procure
murder as well as the actual perpetrators, the Virginia provision encom-
passes only the latter. Absent other provisions, drug kingpins or dealers
who commission murders but do not carry out the actual killings them-
selves could not be charged with capital murder in Virginia. This is
troubling if such individuals are considered to be as culpable as their
agents. Neither Virginia's general conspiracy statutes nor its drug con-
spiracy statute9 allow conspirators to a drug-related murder to be charged
with capital murder. Furthermore, Virginia's "triggerman" statute pro-
vides that accessories and accomplices to murder who do not actually kill
can generally only be charged and convicted of first degree murder rather
than capital murder. 10 However, the murder forhire provision of Virginia's
capital murderstatute, although not crafted with drug rings orcrime groups
in mind, would probably encompass drug kingpins or others who commis-
sion murders. 11
A second difference between the U.S. and Virginia statutes is that
Virginia requires a killing in the commission of adrug transaction to be "for
the purpose of furthering" the drug transaction. The U.S. statute has no
such requirement and it appears that any intentional killing in a drug deal
is punishable by the death penalty. The Virginia legislature, had it wanted
to sweep all premeditated killings committed during drug transactions
within the terms of the statute, especially with the federal statute available
as an example, could have omitted the purpose phrase. If § 18.2-31(9)
ended after"a Schedule I or II controlled substance," premeditated killings
committed during drug transactions would have been capital murders. In
fact, that is how the new subsection originally read when passed by the
House of Delegates. The Virginia Senate, however, amended the provi-
sion, adding "when such killing is for the purpose of furthering the
commission or attempted commission of such violation."' 2 The House
passed the amended provision,13 which was signed by Governor Wilder on
April 9, 1990, effective July 1 of that year.14 The amendment indicates that
the legislature intended to narrow the provision to impose death penalty
eligibility only upon those who kill to further or advance ongoing drug
deals.
The Bottom Line
In assessing the reach of a newly enacted statute, it is frequently
useful to consider some specific situations. For example, consider a drug
deal in which the buyer pays for the substance but the seller refuses to
surrender the goods. Buyer kills the seller and consumes the drugs. He
should not be charged with capital murder under § 18.2-31(9) because
possession of a controlled substance is not a violation of § 18.2-248 as
required. In addition, such a murder might be second degree and for that
reason also not encompassed by drug felony capital murder.
Consider also a situation in which a seller, about to consummate a
deal, suddenly realizes that the purchaser is an undercover agent. The
seller kills the agent to prevent his own arrest. The murder here thwarts
the drug transaction, rather than furthering it as required by § 18.2-31(9).
Can the seller be charged with drug felony capital murder? The situation
is not encompassed by the words of the statute but clearly is within the
provision's spirit.
Third, the head of a drug ring is feeling the pressure of competition
by a rival organization. He orders an underling to kill a particularly
troublesome member of the rival gang. The underling successfully
completes the task. Neither individual could be charged with drug felony
capital murder because the killing did not occur during a drug transaction.
The drug ring boss is further insulated from prosecution under this
provision because he did not do the actual killing. Both might be
susceptible to capital murder charges under the murder for hire provision.
Finally, an individual processes cocaine intending to sell it upon
completion. During a police raid upon his establishment, he kills a police
officer. He could be charged with drug felony capital murder.
Section 18.2-31(9) is well written and fairly clear. A careful
reading of the provision and its predicate statutes reveals the requirements
for prosecution for drug felony capital murder. Most likely situations are
easily categorized as encompassed by or not encompassed by the provi-
sion, although the status of some, such as the undercover agent hypotheti-
cal, remains unclear. The most important thing to know about § 18.2-31(9)
is that it classifies some but not all drug-related homicides as capital
murder. Whether such a killing is capital murder will depend on the facts
of each case.
I Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-11 (1991).
2 Va. Code Ann. §§ 54.1-3446 (1991), 54.1-3448 (1991).
3 Bailey v. Commonwealth, 191 Va. 510, 62 S.E.2d 28 (1950);
Akers v. Commonwealth, 216 Va. 40,216 S.E.2d 28 (1975); Hah'ston 1'.
Commonwealth, 217 Va. 429,230 S.E.2d 626 (1976); Smith v. Common-
wealth, 220 Va. 696, 261 S.E.2d 550 (1980).
4 Hairston, 217 Va. at 432, 230 S.E.2d at 628; Smith, 220 Va. at
700, 261 S.E.2d at 553.
5 Possession of a controlled substance is itself a specific intent
crime. To be convicted, an accused must be shown to have intentionally
possessed the substance while knowing of its presence and character. See
Clodfelter v. Commonwealth, 218 Va. 619,238 S.E.2d 820 (1977).
6 In fact, possession of controlled substances violates Va. Code
Ann. § 18.2-250 (1991).
7 21 U.S.C. § 848(e)(1)(A) reads:
(A) any person engaging in or working in furtherance of
a continuing criminal enterprise, or any person en-
gaging in an offense punishable under section
841(b)(1)(A) or section 960(b)(1) of this title who
intentionally kills or counsels, commands, induces,
procures or causes the intentional killing of an indi-
vidual and such killing results, shall be sentenced to
any term of imprisonment ... or may be sentenced to
death;
Section 841 (b)(1)(A) authorizes penalties of up to life imprison-
ment for persons convicted of dealing in large quantities of drugs. If
death or serious injury occurs as a result of the drug dealing activity,
minimum sentence is twenty years.
Section 960(b)(1) details similar penalties for those convicted of
importing and exporting a controlled substance.
8 Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-22 (1991) currently provides that, "Every
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person who so conspires to commit an offense which is punishable by
death shall be guilty of a Class 3 felony."
9 Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-256 stipulates that conspiracy to commit
any offense defined in Chapter 7, Article 1, which includes § 18.2-248,
is punishable to no greater extent than the maximum punishment pre-
scribed for the offense. The maximum foraviolation of § 18.2-248 is life
imprisonment. See supra Statutory Structure.
10 Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-18 (1991). Murder for hire is excepted
from the rule.
I1 Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-31(2) (1991) stipulates that, "the willful,
deliberate, and premeditated killing of any person by another for hire,"
is capital murder. Section 18.2-18 allows hirors to be charged with and
convicted of capital murder.
12 1990 Journals of the Senate of Virginia 1069 (1990).
13 1990 Journal of the House of Delegates of the Commonwealth
of Virginia 1635 (1990).
14d. at 1965-66.
OPPOSING PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES UNDER BATSON
BY: MARCUS E. GARCIA AND JAMES W. MILLER JR.
Introduction
Since the ratification of the fourteenth amendment to the
United States Constitution in 1868, the United States Supreme Court has
addressed purposeful racial discrimination in the selection ofjurors. For
example, in Strauder v. West Virginia,l the Court invalidated a state
statute which mandated that only white men could serve as jurors. More
recently, the Court stated, "[t]he Constitution requires ... that we look
beyond the face of the statute defining juror qualifications and also
consider challenged selection practices to afford 'protection against
action of the State through its administrative officers in effecting the
prohibited discrimination." 2 In Siwain v. Alabama,3 the Court held that
the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment could be
violated if the State's exercise of peremptory challenges excluded
members of the defendant's race.
In Swain, "[t]he Court sought to accommodate the prosecutor's
historical privilege of peremptory challenge free of judicial control and
the constitutional prohibition on exclusion of persons from jury service
on account of race."4 "To preserve the peremptory nature of the
prosecutor's challenge, the Court in Swain declined to scrutinize his
actions in a particular case by relying on a presumption that he properly
exercised the State's challenges."'5 To overcome this presumption, the
Court held that a defendant could construct aprima facie case by showing
"evidence that a prosecutor 'in case after case, whatever the circum-
stances, whatever the crime and whoever the defendant or the victim may
be, is responsible for the removal of Negroes who have been selected as
qualified jurors by the jury commissioners and who have survived
challenges for cause, with the result that no Negroes ever serve on petit
juries."' 6 Although the prosecutor in Swain used peremptory challenges
to strike all six eligible blacks on the jury venire, resulting in an all white
jury, the Court held that the defendant "offered no proof of the circum-
stances under which prosecutors were responsible for striking black
jurors beyond the facts of his own case."
'7
In Batson v. Kentuckys the Court reaffirmed that purposeful
discrimination based on race in the selection ofjurors violates the Equal
Protection Clause. In addition, the Court stated, "prosecutors' peremp-
tory challenges are now largely immune from constitutional scrutiny"
due to the "evidentiary formulation" under Swain which "reasoned that
proof of repeated striking of blacks over a number of cases was necessary
to establish a violation of the Equal Protection Clause." 9 Therefore, the
Court held, "a defendant may make a prima facie showing of purposeful
racial discrimination in selection of the venire by relying solely on the
facts concerning its selection in his case." 0 The Court stated that the
defendant
first must show that he is a member of cognizable
racial group ... and that the prosecutorhas exercised
peremptory challenges to remove from the venire
members of the defendant's race. Second, the
defendant is entitled to rely on the fact, as to which
there can be no dispute, that peremptory challenges
constitute ajury selection practice that permits 'those
to discriminate who are of a mind to discriminate.'
Finally, the defendant must show that these facts
and any other relevant circumstances raise an infer-
ence that the prosecutor used thatpractice to exclude
the veniremen from the petitjury on account of their
race. This combination of factors in the empaneling
of the petit jury, as in the selection of the venire,
raises the necessary inference of purposeful dis-
crimination. I I
In evaluating the defendant's case, "the trial court should consider all
relevant circumstances" such as a"pattem of strikes" or"the prosecutor's
questions or statements during voir dire and in exercising his chal-
lenges."12
Once the trial judge determines that the defendant has made a
prima facie case, the burden of proof then shifts to the prosecutor to
"articulate a neutral explanation related to the particular case to be
tried." 13 The Court stated that the prosecutor cannot rebut the defendant's
prima facie case "by stating merely that he challenged jurors of the
defendant's race on the assumption-or his intuitive judgement-that they
would be partial to the defendant because of their shared race," nor
"merely by denying that he had discriminatory motive" or that he acted
in good faith.14 "[T]he prosecutor must give a 'clear and reasonably
specific' explanation of his 'legitimate reasons' for exercising the
challenges."' 15 But, the Court stated, "the prosecutor's explanation need
not rise to the level justifying exercise of a challenge for cause."'t 6 Once
the prosecutor articulates a neutral reason for a disputed peremptory
challenge, the trial court judge then must determine whether or not the
peremptory challenge was discriminatory.
The trial court's determination "is a finding of fact" which "a
reviewing court ordinarily should give... great deference."' 17 The Court
also stated, "[i]n light of the variety ofjury selection practices followed
in our state and federal courts, we make no attempt to instruct these courts
how best to implement our holding" and, as to remedies, it stated, "we
express no view on whether it is more appropriate in a particular case.
.. for the trial court to discharge the venire and select a new jury from a
panel not previously associated with the case or to disallow the discrimi-
natory challenges and resume selection with the improperly challenged
jurors reinstated on the venire."Is Thus, the Court gave trial judges wide
latitude in the application of the Batson rule to find purposeful discrimi-
nation in peremptory challenges.
It is also important that theBatson Court noted that purposeful
discrimination in the selection ofjurors not only deprives the defendant
